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Introduction
In this paper, we consider a resident system with N species together with a set of invaders. In order to motivate this setup, which is rooted in ecology and evolution theory, we provide relevant examples here. In ecological succession, after a disturbance (e.g. wildfire, lava flow, or landslide), species from an existing pool colonize the new habitat. During the succession process, which starts with these pioneering plants and animals and stops when a long-term stable community emerges, a number of species replace other ones [12, 25] . In ecological invasion theory, the hypothesis of "invasional meltdown" proposes that an invasive species in a new environment can facilitate the invasion of other nonnative species [28] . However, there are also examples when multi-species invasion can reduce the negative impact of a single exotic plant species on the native (i.e. resident) plant community.
Invasion by multiple species can happen through human activity or by natural causes. For instance, the latter occurred during the formation of the Isthmus of Panama when the migration between North and South America led to the last and most conspicuous wave, the great American interchange, around 3 million years ago [23, 29] . Furthermore, sympatric speciation is the evolution of a new species from a surviving ancestral species, while both live in the same habitat. An important question is: What is the number of mutants in a large ecosystem? The number of coexisting mutants depends on the size of the ancestral species and the time duration until extinction of nonsuccessful mutants. In particular, we cannot rule out the possibility that an already introduced nonsuccessful mutant can survive if a new mutant arises in another species, and together can successfully invade the ancestral system.
From the biological perspective, there are two main differences between evolutionary and ecological models. Firstly, in evolution, mutation is rare in two senses; the mutant occurs with low density, and there is a long time duration between two mutation events. In ecological models, more than one invasive species can be introduced at (almost) the same time and in large numbers either by accident or on purpose through human activities. Secondly, in evolution, the mutant phenotypes are not arbitrary, contrary to ecology where the invasive species has arbitrary traits. Usually, during evolution, the mutant and the wild phenotypes do not radically differ from each other. Often, the interaction parameters in the evolutionary model either come from the same game and the phenotypes are different (see [6, 7, 15] ) or interaction parameters between resident and mutant phenotypes are not so different. This contrasts to models in invasion ecology where the phenotypic similarity between exotic and native species cannot be assumed. One well-known example of dissimilar phenotypes is from Australia, when the invasive mammals substitute for the native marsupials. However, Hutchinson [20] has already emphasized that biotic evolution cannot be separated from ecology, since ecological factors (like competition and feeding) have a curtailing effect on the evolutionary success of all mutants and/or species.
From the mathematical point of view, the examples mentioned above can be modelled by a dynamical system where several invaders appear in a resident system (with N species). For simplicity, we concentrate on the case when there is maximum of N invaders. In essence: invaders (whether they migrate from another ecosystem or are mutants) are introduced into any ecosystem, it is the ecological interactions that determine whether the new ecotypes die out or replace some resident species in the long run.
In the short term, one of the fundamental results of theoretical ecology that has received a great deal of attention in the literature (e.g. [27, 31] ) is the characterization of the successful invasion of a stable N -species resident system by mutant phenotypes. Less attention has been placed on the question of what happens after the successful invasion. Possible outcomes include situations where both residents and mutants coexist in all or some species (either by approaching a stable coexistence equilibrium or through more complicated dynamics such a periodic cycles) [32] . It is also possible that the ecosystem collapses through species extinction (e.g. evolutionary suicide [17] ).
In this paper, we are more interested in the outcome whereby the resident phenotype dies out and is replaced by the mutant phenotype. We examine necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for two such situations. In the first, there is a single mutant phenotype in one of the species. That is, we consider the case where mutation is rare so that multiple mutant phenotypes either in the same species or in several species cannot occur at the same time. If the mutant can invade a stable equilibrium of the monomorphic N -species resident system that has all species present and the system evolves to a stable equilibrium of the N -species resident-mutant system with all species present but the one species has only the mutant phenotype, we say that "evolutionary substitution " has occurred.
At the other extreme, there are mutant phenotypes in each of the species. In this second case, if a stable equilibrium of the monomorphic N -species resident system that has all species present can be invaded by the mutants and the system evolves to a stable equilibrium of the N -species resident-mutant system with all species present but only mutant phenotypes, there has been an "evolutionary replacement " .
Our investigation is based on the dynamics of evolving population sizes for the resident and mutant phenotypes of the N -species evolutionary ecology system that assumes these dynamics are of Lotka-Volterra (LV) type. 1 This extends the work of Garay and Varga [16] and Cressman and Garay [6] who investigated resident stability/invadability in such LV systems rather than substitution/replacement. In particular, the monomorphic model of Cressman and Garay [6] examines the invadability of the resident system when there is a single mutant phenotype in each species. As we will see, the methods developed there are also essential to our results on evolutionary substitution and replacement.
In Sect. 2, we illustrate the problem by summarizing the theory for a single species. In Sect. 3, we investigate evolutionary substitution in the N -species LV resident-mutant dynamical system. Theorem 1 shows that if the mutant can invade the N -species resident system but the resident phenotype cannot invade the equilibrium with all species present but the one species has only the mutant phenotype, then there can be no coexistence equilibrium with all phenotypes, an important requirement for evolutionary substitution to occur. Theorems 2 and 3 use this result to prove that these two invasion criteria combine to imply evolutionary substitution occurs for two-species competitive systems and for general N -species LV systems when the mutant phenotype dominates the resident.
In Sect. 4, we concentrate on evolutionary replacement in two species (i.e. N = 2) since Theorem 1 does not generalize to exclude coexistence equilibria when there are mutant phenotypes in both species (see Example 2 of Sect. 4). Furthermore, Example 3 shows care must be taken extending the dominance concept of Sect. 3. However, if the successful invasions occur through a sequence of evolutionary substitutions that does not depend on whether a rare mutant first appears in species one or in species two (which we call "historically independent replacement"), then evolutionary replacement ensues (see Theorem 4 there). The biological importance of this concept is illustrated at the end of Sect. 5. This final section also discusses other results of the paper from a biological perspective.
Evolutionary Substitution and Replacement in Single-Species LV Systems
To illustrate these evolutionary aspects, consider a single species (i.e. N = 1) with one resident and one mutant phenotype. In this case, evolutionary substitution and evolutionary replacement are equivalent since the question in both cases is whether the mutant phenotype becomes established in the system and the resident phenotype goes extinct.
The resident system of Lotka-Volterra type is of the forṁ
where ρ 1 is the resident density, r 1 is the intrinsic growth rate and m R R 11 is the interaction parameter. Clearly, this system has a stable equilibrium with ρ * 1 > 0 (i.e. with the resident species present) if and only if the intrinsic growth is positive and the interaction term is negative (in which case the equilibrium is ρ * 1 = −r 1 /m R R 11 ). 2 We assume that the difference between resident and mutant behaviour is contained in the interaction parameters (e.g. the parameter m R I 11 models the linear effect that the mutant density μ 1 has on the growth rate of the resident phenotype). 3 The corresponding resident-mutant system is thenρ
If this models competition (i.e. all four interaction parameters are negative), it is well known [19] that the two-dimensional dynamical system evolves to the mutant equilibrium μ * 1 = −r 1 /m I I 11 if and only if the mutant can invade the resident equilibrium, but the resident cannot invade the mutant equilibrium.
We say that general LV systems of form (2) exhibit evolutionary substitution if (i) the one-dimensional resident system and mutant system, respectively, each have a stable equilibrium with positive density; (ii) the resident (respectively, mutant) equilibrium is unstable (respectively, stable) since it can be invaded by the mutant phenotype (respectively, cannot be invaded by the resident phenotype) in the two-dimensional resident-mutant system (2); and (iii) after the mutant successfully invades the resident, the system evolves to the mutant equilibrium. In fact, these two-dimensional LV systems exhibit evolutionary substitution if and only if r 1 > 0, m R R 11 < 0, m I I 11 < 0 (i.e. the resident system and the mutant system each have a globally stable equilibrium) and m I R 11 ≥ m R R 11 , m I I 11 ≥ m R I 11 with strict inequality in at least one of these two conditions.
As interpreted by Cressman and Garay [6] , r 1 > 0, m R R 11 < 0, m I I 11 < 0 are the ecological stability conditions and m I I 11 ≥ m R I 11 with m I R 11 > m R R 11 if m I I 11 = m R I 11 means that the mutant phenotype is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). That is, in addition to ecological stability, we have evolutionary stability of the mutant phenotype since it is an ESS of the evolutionary 2 The notation used here is consistent with the more complicated LV systems in the remainder of the paper (e.g.
(3)) . It can be considerably simplified in this special case. For instance, with r 1 = r > 0 and m R R 11 = m < 0, (1) is the logistic equation (i.e. positive intrinsic growth and negative density dependence) in more standard notation. 3 That is, the intrinsic growth rate is independent of species phenotype. The discussion here does not rely on this assumption. In fact, for the N -species systems of Sects. 3 and 4, Theorems 1 to 4 do not depend on our assumption that, for each species k, the resident and mutant phenotypes have the same intrinsic growth rate r k . Moreover, the proofs of these results do not rely on this assumption either. game given by the 2 × 2 payoff matrix (or interaction matrix) In game-theoretic terms [4] , the final condition for evolutionary substitution (i.e. m I R
is equivalent to the mutant phenotype being a neighbourhood invader strategy (NIS) of the resident phenotype (i.e. the mutant phenotype that is sufficiently rare successfully invades the resident phenotype). Strategies that satisfy both the ESS and NIS conditions for matrix games such as given by the 2 × 2 payoff matrix above are known as ESNIS [4] .
In summary, there is evolutionary substitution/replacement in a single-species LV system if and only if (i) there is ecological stability in the resident system and in the mutant system (ii) the resident phenotype cannot invade the mutant phenotype (i.e. the mutant phenotype is an ESS of the interaction matrix for the resident-mutant evolutionary game), and (iii) the mutant phenotype can invade the resident phenotype (i.e. the mutant phenotype is a NIS of the resident phenotype for this interaction matrix).
Evolutionary Substitution in N-Species
In this section, we assume that the N -species resident system has one resident phenotype in each species and that there is a single mutant phenotype in exactly one species (which, without loss of generality, we take as species one). If r k and ρ k , respectively, are the intrinsic growth rate and resident phenotype density of species k and μ 1 is the density of the mutant phenotype, then the resident-mutant Lotka-Volterra system iṡ
where k = 1, . . . , N . In particular, for LV systems, the individual growth rate of a given phenotype (e.g.ρ k /ρ k ) is linear functions of the densities of all phenotypes present in the system. One interpretation of the interaction parameters m R R kl , m R I k1 , m I R 1l and m I I 11 adopts the payoff terminology of evolutionary game theory [6] . Then m R R kl (respectively, m R I k1 ) is the payoff to a resident phenotype (or strategy) in species k when interacting with a resident phenotype in species l (respectively, the intruder or mutant phenotype). 4 Similarly, m I R 1l and m I I 11 are payoffs to the mutant phenotype. That is, the superscripts denote the phenotypes and the subscripts are the species in the interaction where the first superscript and subscript specify the phenotype and species of the individual receiving the payoff, respectively.
The first requirement for evolutionary substitution is that this resident system is stable in the absence of mutants. In particular, from the biological perspective, this means that there is species coexistence in the residence system. Mathematically, there is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium ρ * = (ρ * 1 , . . . , ρ * N ) with all components positive (i.e. ρ * ∈ R N >0 ) for the resident systemρ
To avoid technical complications, we assume that this stability is determined through the linearization of (4) about ρ * . That is, we assume that the resident system is hyperbolic (i.e. all eigenvalues of the N × N Jacobian matrix of this linearization, which has kl entry ρ * k m R R kl , have nonzero real parts). 5 Thus, this hyperbolic resident system is stable if and only if all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix have negative real parts. Let M R R be the N × N matrix whose entries are the payoffs m R R kl for interactions between residents (similarly, M I R denotes the 1 × N matrix of payoffs to mutants interacting with residents, etc.). Then, in particular, M R R is invertible since its determinant is nonzero and so ρ * = − M R R −1 r where r is the column vector whose k th component is the intrinsic growth rate r k of species k.
The next requirement is that the mutant phenotype can invade. That is, (ρ * , 0) is not a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium of the resident-mutant system (3). (ρ * , 0) will be unstable in the resident-mutant system if the invasion fitness λ I 1 ≡ r 1 + N l=1 m I R 1l ρ * l of the mutant phenotype at this equilibrium is greater than the fitness of the resident phenotype
. On the other hand, (ρ * , 0) is locally asymptotically stable if λ I 1 < 0. In the intermediate case where λ I 1 = 0, the mutant phenotype is initially selectively neutral when invading the resident equilibrium. This case was analysed by Cressman and Garay [6, 7] who showed that, for Lotka-Volterra systems, (ρ * , 0) is invadable if and only if
Finally, after successful invasion by the mutant, evolutionary substitution requires that the resident-mutant system must evolve to a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium (0, ρ 2 , . . . , ρ N , μ 1 ) with all species present, but species one has only mutant phenotypes. In particular, this equilibrium cannot be invaded by the resident phenotype of species one. That is, the invasion fitness of the resident phenotype of species one, λ R 1 ≡ r 1 + N l=2 m R R 1l ρ l + m R I 11 μ 1 cannot be positive at (0, ρ 2 , . . . , ρ N , μ 1 ). 6 The question arises whether hyperbolic stability of ρ * and ( ρ 2 , . . . , ρ N , μ 1 ) in their respective N -dimensional Lotka-Volterra systems (which we assume from now on) implies evolutionary substitution if the mutant phenotype can invade (ρ * , 0), but the resident phenotype of species one cannot invade (0, ρ 2 , . . . , ρ N , μ 1 ). Such an implication would generalize the evolutionary substitution in a single species discussed in Sect. 2. Our first result (Theorem 1) implies that a unique coexistence equilibrium is impossible in this case.
. . , N and ρ j > 0 for j = 2, . . . , N and μ 1 > 0). Also assume that E 1 and E 2 5 The Jacobian matrix at the resident equilibrium ρ * is 6 In the threshold case when the resident phenotype is initially selectively neutral (i.e. λ R 1 = 0), the analogue of M I I − M I R M R R −1 M R I must now be negative (see the B-matrix method of Cressman and Garay [6] ). are locally asymptotically stable equilibria for system (3) restricted to their respective Ndimensional boundary face and that the mutant phenotype can invade E 1 but the resident phenotype of species one cannot invade E 2 . 7 Then there is no isolated interior equilibrium 8 for the N + 1-dimensional LV system.
) be an isolated interior equilibrium for (3), which for convenience, we rewrite aṡ
The isolatedness assumption implies that the (N + 1) × (N + 1) interaction matrix A with entries a i j is invertible. An application of Cramer's Rule (see, for instance, the proof of Theorem 13.5.7 in Hofbauer and Sigmund [19] ) shows that
whenever the principal submatrix A i of A formed by deleting the i th row and column is nonsingular and, apart from the ith coordinate which is then taken as x i i = 0, the remaining coordinates of
are defined as the coordinates of the unique solution to the linear system r j + (Ax) j = 0 for all j = i.
From the assumptions in the statement of the theorem, x 1 (respectively, x N +1 ) is the equilibrium E 2 (respectively, E 1 ). Since x 1 and x N +1 are locally asymptotically stable in their respective N -dimensional boundary faces, A 1 and A N +1 are both nonsingular N × N matrices and their determinants | A 1 | and | A N +1 | have the same sign. Moreover, since the mutant phenotype can invade the resident equilibrium, r N +1 + (Ax N +1 ) N +1 ≥ 0, and since the resident phenotype cannot invade the mutant equilibrium, r 1 + (Ax 1 ) 1 ≤ 0. Thus,
which contradicts that x * is an interior equilibrium.
Remark 1
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the nonsingularity of A. For general A, (5) can be rewritten as
In fact, this reformulation holds whenever A i is nonsingular for any solution x * of Ax +r = 0 (see the proof in "Appendix A1"). 9 Thus, if A is singular, then r i + (Ax i ) i = 0 whenever A i is nonsingular (in particular, for i = 1 and i = N + 1). That is, λ I 1 = 0 = λ R 1 . In this case, Ax 1 + r = 0 = Ax N +1 + r and so the line segment joining E 2 = x 1 and E 1 = x N +1 is all equilibria of system (3). In particular, E 2 is not locally asymptotically stable in the extended, (N + 1)-dimensional phase space since there are arbitrarily close initial points on this line segment that do not evolve to it (i.e. it can be invaded by the resident phenotype of species one). Thus, the conclusion of Theorem 1 can be strengthened to show that there is no interior equilibrium for the N + 1-dimensional LV system when the invasion conditions hold.
By Theorem 1 and Remark 1, when evolutionary substitution occurs, no interior equilibrium exists. However, the following two-species example illustrates that the invasion conditions of Theorem 1 do not guarantee that all interior trajectories of the resident-mutant system (3) converge to the equilibrium with both species present, but species one has only the mutant phenotype (i.e. to E 2 = (0, ρ 2 , μ 1 )). This contrasts with the single-species outcome of Sect. 2 where there is global convergence to the mutant phenotype.
Example 1
Consider the resident-mutant three-dimensional LV systeṁ
It is readily checked that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied for N = 2, equilibria
The equilibria of (7) are the origin O = (0, 0, 0), P + = E 2 (which are asymptotically stable 10 ) and the saddle points P − = E 1 and S = (0, 1 2 , 0). The global dynamics of (7) as well as the dynamics of the resident subsysteṁ
and of the mutant subsystemμ
are presented in Fig. 1 . The three thick red curves portray nonplanar trajectories, including the outgoing trajectory of P − . Due to lack of space, ingoing and outgoing trajectories of the saddle point S are not shown but clearly indicated by trajectories nearby. All (thin) black trajectory curves are planar. Orientation of the trajectories is determined by the stability properties of the equilibria (see also the arrows for the red curves). Please observe the intrinsic similarities between our Fig. 1 and Figure 7 .1 in Hofbauer and Sigmund [19] . When ρ 1 in (8) is changed to μ 1 in (9), it is immediate that the dynamics in the μ 1 -ρ 2 plane is exactly the same as in the ρ 1 -ρ 2 plane. Thus, there is symmetry between trajectories in these two planes for Fig. 1 . Also note that all trajectories of system (7) with ρ 1 > 0 and μ 1 > 0 satisfy d dt
and the resident phenotype of species one disappears in the long run.
By Example 1, care must be taken in the interpretation of evolutionary substitution for N -species LV systems when N ≥ 2. Although all interior trajectories of (7) that are initially close to E 1 = (1, 1, 0) converge to E 2 = (0, 1, 1), this result does not extend to all interior 10 Since 0 < ρ 2 < 1 2 impliesρ 2 < 0 and thusρ 2 < − 1 2 ρ 2 < 0 as well asμ 1 < − 1 2 μ 1 < 0 , the origin attracts all points of the open, unbounded 3D rectangle 0 < ρ 1 
The region of attraction of the origin is separated from the rest of the phase portrait by (the nonnegative part of) the two-dimensional, unbounded stable manifold of the saddle point S.
Author's personal copy
Dynamic Games and Applications Fig. 1 Phase portrait of the LV system (7) trajectories. For the remainder of this section, we require that all interior trajectories converge to E 2 given in the statement of Theorem 1 under evolutionary substitution. Then Example 1 shows that the invasion conditions of Theorem 1 do not imply evolutionary substitution for two-species LV systems. On the other hand, if the LV system has more structure, the invasion criteria of Theorem 1 can be equivalent to evolutionary substitution. The following discusses two such systems of biological importance.
First, for two-species competitive LV systems, evolutionary substitution is equivalent to the invasion criteria. These resident-mutant systems have the forṁ
( 1 0 ) where r 1 = r 3 and r 2 are all positive and a i j < 0 for i, j = 1, 2, 3. By the discussion above, the invasion criteria are necessary for evolutionary substitution. The following theorem proves the converse. In fact, for such systems, the invasion criteria imply that E 2 = (0, ρ 2 , μ 1 ) is globally asymptotically stable.
are equilibria of the twospecies resident-mutant competitive LV system (10) with both species present (i.e. ρ * i > 0 for i = 1, 2, ρ 2 > 0 and μ 1 > 0) and satisfying r 1 = r 3 > 0, r 2 > 0 and a i j < 0 for i, j = 1, 2, 3. Also assume that E 1 and E 2 are locally asymptotically stable equilibria for system (10) restricted to their respective two-dimensional boundary face. If the mutant phenotype can invade E 1 but the resident phenotype of species one cannot invade E 2 , then E 2 is globally asymptotically stable. 11
Proof It is well known (e.g. [32] ) that the dynamic behaviour of an N + 1-dimensional competitive LV system is determined by its restriction to an invariant N -dimensional hypersurface called the carrying simplex [31] . For the three-dimensional system (10), the two-dimensional carrying simplex in the first octant is homeomorphic to a triangle whose three edges correspond to boundary invariant curves of (10) whose endpoints are the carrying capacities −r i /a ii of the logistic equation for each species i on its own. By Theorem 1 and Remark 1, (10) has no interior equilibria. Moreover, E 1 ≡ (ρ * 1 , ρ * 2 , 0) corresponds to a saddle point on the x 1 x 2 edge whose stable manifold is this edge and E 2 ≡ (0, ρ 2 , μ 1 ) corresponds to a stable equilibrium on the x 2 x 3 edge of the triangle. Thus, of the 33 possible classes of dynamic behaviour classified by [32] , the dynamics on the triangle is given by one of classes 9-12 depending on the behaviour on the x 1 x 3 edge. In all four classes, the equilibrium corresponding to E 2 is globally asymptotically stable.
Evolutionary substitution also occurs when the mutant phenotype "dominates" the resident phenotype it substitutes for according to the following theorem. Here, dominance is used in the game-theoretic sense in that the expected payoff (or fitness) of an individual using the mutant phenotype is greater than that of the resident phenotype (i.e. the mutant is more fit) whenever some phenotypes are present (see (11)).
Theorem 3
As in Theorem 1, let E 1 ≡ (ρ * , 0) and E 2 ≡ (0, ρ 2 , . . . , ρ N , μ 1 ) be equilibria of the N -species resident-mutant LV system (3) with all species present (i.e. ρ * i > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N and ρ j > 0 for j = 2, . . . , N and μ 1 > 0). Furthermore, assume that all forward trajectories of (3) are bounded 12 and that E 2 is globally asymptotically stable equilibrium for system (3) restricted to its N -dimensional boundary face. If the mutant phenotype is always more fit than the resident phenotype of species one, then there is no interior equilibrium, the resident phenotype of species one goes extinct, and E 2 is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium for system (3) . Moreover, if no interior trajectories converge to the boundary of the N -dimensional boundary face containing E 2 , then evolutionary substitution occurs.
Proof Since the mutant phenotype is always more fit than the resident phenotype of species one
for all (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . , ρ N , μ 1 ) with nonnegative components and at least one component positive. In particular, this inequality holds at E 1 and E 2 (i.e. λ I 1 > 0 and λ R 1 < 0). Since λ R 1 < 0 and E 2 is globally asymptotically stable equilibrium for system (3) restricted to its N -dimensional boundary face, E 2 is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium for system (3) . The resident phenotype of species one goes extinct if every interior trajectory of (3) converges to the N -dimensional boundary face with ρ 1 = 0. Actually, this convergence holds for every trajectory with ρ 1 and μ 1 initially both positive. To see this, consider a given trajectory with ρ 1 and μ 1 initially positive. The first and the last equation of system (3) yield that d dt ρ 1 μ 1 equals
where ρ 1 and μ 1 are both positive. The final inequality follows from (11) . Thus, ρ 1 μ 1 is a strictly decreasing function along every trajectory where ρ 1 and μ 1 are initially both positive. For the given interior trajectory, define lim t→∞
is bounded. Suppose that ρ 1 does not converge to 0 (i.e. lim sup t→∞ ρ 1 (t) > 0). Thus, C > 0 and there exists a limit point of the given trajectory with ρ 1 and μ 1 both positive. Any trajectory that is initially at this limit point is also in the limit set of the given trajectory. Since ρ 1 μ 1 is a strictly decreasing at this initial point, lim t→∞ ρ 1 (t) μ 1 (t) < C, a contradiction. Since the resident phenotype ρ 1 goes extinct, there can be no interior equilibrium.
As a by-product of the previous considerations, we see that interior trajectories converge to nonempty compact subsets of the N -dimensional boundary face ρ 1 = 0 of the nonnegative (N + 1)-dimensional orthant. This is the boundary face that contains equilibrium E 2 . By the last assumption of the theorem, interior trajectories have a limit point with the properties ρ 1 = 0 and ρ 2 ρ 3 . . . ρ N μ 1 > 0. Since E 2 is globally asymptotically stable for system (3) restricted to the face ρ 1 = 0 and locally asymptotically stable for the full resident-intruder system (3) on R N +1 ≥0 , E 2 is the only limit point of any given interior trajectory. That is, interior trajectories converge to E 2 . In other words, evolutionary substitution occurs.
Remark 2
The condition in Theorem 3 that E 2 is globally asymptotically stable equilibria for system (3) restricted to its N -dimensional boundary face is necessary for the conclusion that evolutionary substitution occurs. To see this, consider Example 1 again. In it, we have that the mutant fitness −4 + 7ρ 2 − 3μ 1 is always greater than the fitness −4 − 3ρ 1 + 7ρ 2 − 4μ 1 of the resident phenotype of species one when ρ 1 and μ 1 are positive. However, evolutionary substitution does not occur in Example 1 since (0, 0, 0) is locally asymptotically stable. Note that Theorem 3 also makes the biologically reasonable assumption that the density of each species must be bounded.
Evolutionary Replacement
In this section, we assume that the N -species system has one resident phenotype and one mutant phenotype in each species. Then, the resident-mutant Lotka-Volterra system iṡ
where
The first requirement of evolutionary replacement is that the invasion criteria for system (12) be satisfied. That is, the N -dimensional resident system has a locally asymptotically stable interior equilibrium E 1 ≡ (ρ * , 0) (where ρ * i > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ) that can be invaded by the mutant phenotypes and the N -dimensional mutant system has a locally asymptotically stable interior equilibrium E 2 ≡ (0, μ * ) (where μ * i > 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ) that cannot be invaded by the resident phenotypes. The following example shows that these invasion conditions do not rule out the existence of a stable interior equilibrium of the residentmutant system. Thus, the obvious generalization of Theorem 1 is not valid for evolutionary replacement.
We then examine extensions of the domination concept of Theorem 3 to replacement systems. In this section, we concentrate on examples with two species (i.e. N = 2) since Example 1 shows that care must already be taken when there are two species and a single mutant phenotype.
Example 2 Consider the resident-mutant systeṁ
The intrinsic growth rates of species one and two are r 1 = 2 and r 2 = 3, respectively. This has an interior equilibrium at (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , μ 1 , μ 2 ) = (1, 1, 1, 1) that is locally asymptotically stable since the only eigenvalue of the corresponding 4 × 4 Jacobian matrix is −1 (with multiplicity 4). The resident system has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium at (ρ * 1 , ρ * 2 ) = (2, 3), and the mutant system also has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium at (μ * 1 , μ * 2 ) = (2, 3). Moreover, to analyse whether (ρ * 1 , ρ * 2 ) can be invaded, we calculate λ
, it is not immediately clear whether (ρ * 1 , ρ * 2 , 0, 0) = (2, 3, 0, 0) (respectively, (0, 0, μ * 1 , μ * 2 ) = (0, 0, 2, 3)) can be invaded. To avoid the use of B-matrix methods for these neutral invasion coefficients [6] , we consider instead the slightly perturbed systeṁ
with some ε > 0. The new interior equilibrium 1−5ε
will still be locally asymptotically stable when ε is sufficiently small. Moreover, the equilibrium of the resident system remains unchanged at (ρ * 1 , ρ * 2 , 0, 0) = (2, 3, 0, 0) as does the equilibrium for the mutant system (0, 0, μ * 1 , μ * 2 ) = (0, 0, 2, 3). However, it is now clear that both invader phenotypes can invade (ρ * 1 , ρ * 2 , 0, 0), since λ I
it is clear that more conditions are needed besides our invasion criteria in order to guarantee evolutionary replacement. One possibility is to assume that the mutant phenotype "dominates" the resident phenotype in each species as in Theorem 3 (i.e. the mutant phenotype is always more fit than the resident phenotype in each species). Keeping the boundedness assumption on forward trajectories, we see that all interior trajectories of the 2N -dimensional resident-mutant system converge to nonempty compact subsets of the N -dimensional mutant system. In particular, there are no interior equilibria. Moreover, the proof of Theorem 3 easily extends to show that there will be evolutionary replacement when the N -dimensional mutant system has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium (μ * 1 , μ * 2 , . . . , μ * N ) with all species present if interior trajectories do not converge to the boundary of the N -dimensional mutant system. 13 The dominance concept discussed in the previous paragraph is very strong. A weaker form of dominance borrowed from game theory [19] is that some weighted average of the mutant phenotypes is always more fit than some weighted average of the resident phenotypes. This also guarantees there is no interior equilibrium of the resident-mutant system. 14 Unfortunately, the following example based on [2] shows this dominance does not guarantee interior trajectories converge to the N -dimensional mutant system.
Example 3 Consider the two-species resident-mutant competitive systeṁ
There is no interior equilibrium since the average fitness of the mutants dominates the average of the residents (i.e. 1 − 2ρ 1 
Since the intrinsic growth rates for both species are the same, the frequencies x i of the four phenotypes ( e.g.
given by the interaction coefficients (Hofbauer and Sigmund, Exercise 7.5.2, [19] ). If each entry of A is increased by 2 (which does not change the replicator equation) and the variables in (14) are reordered by interchanging ρ 1 with μ 2 , the payoff matrix becomes
which is the example analysed by Akin and Hofbauer [2] . They prove that almost all interior trajectories approach a heteroclinic cycle that follows the edges of the three-dimensional strategy simplex (i.e. the tetrahedron) in the order of vertices
In particular, the resident phenotypes do not go extinct even though ρ 1 ρ 2 μ 1 μ 2 evolves to 0. 13 Specifically, by the dominance assumption, ρ i /μ i for i = 1, 2, . . . , N are all strictly decreasing when ρ i and μ i are initially positive. Since all forward trajectories are bounded, the proof of Theorem 3 shows that lim t→∞ ρ i (t) = 0 for all i (i.e. all resident phenotypes go extinct). Moreover, since no interior trajectories converge to the boundary of the N -dimensional mutant system, each such trajectory has a limit point in the interior of the N -dimensional mutant face. Global asymptotic stability of (μ * 1 , μ * 2 , . . . , μ * N ) on this face combined with its local asymptotic stability in the full resident-mutant system guarantees that it is the only limit point of each interior trajectory. 14 
To see this, consider
where w i > 0 are the weights for the residents and v i > 0 are the weights for the mutants. These weights satisfy w i = 1 = v i . In view of (12), this expression is strictly decreasing at all interior points and so there is no interior equilibrium.
In Example 3, notice that the equilibrium of the resident system (1/7, 1/7) for (14) can be invaded by both mutant phenotypes since λ I 1 = λ I 2 = 1 − 3/7 − 1/7 > 0, whereas the equilibrium of the mutant system (1/5, 1/5) cannot be invaded by either resident phenotype since λ R 1 = λ R 2 = 1 − 2/5 − 5/5 < 0. On the other hand, these equilibria are unstable in their respective two-dimensional system since the determinant of the linearization is negative in both cases. This leaves open the possibility that combining dominance with conditions that these boundary equilibria are locally asymptotically stable in their respective two-dimensional system implies evolutionary replacement. As we will see in the following section, this is indeed the case for two-species competitive systems in biologically significant scenarios where dominance must occur.
Remark 3
Before leaving this section, notice that the time-reversed dynamics for the replicator equation of Example 3 given by the payoff matrix −A provides an excellent illustration of evolutionary replacement. Indeed, since the average payoff of the first two strategies dominates the average payoff of the last two strategies, we also reverse the order of the four strategies and analyse the payoff matrix formed by subtracting 10 from each entry of −A with reordered strategies. The analysis of Akin and Hofbauer [2] shows that the equilibrium of the replicator equation corresponding to (0, 0, 1/13, 1/13) (i.e. the frequency vector (0, 0, 1/2, 1/2)) is globally asymptotically stable.
For the resident-mutant competitive system corresponding to A ,
the residents have equilibrium 1 15 (1, 1) which is globally asymptotically stable on this face and invadable by the mutants since λ I 1,2 = 1−(9+5)/15 > 0. The mutants have equilibrium 1 13 (1, 1) (which is globally asymptotically stable on this face) and this is not invadable since λ R 1,2 = 1 − (7 + 9)/13 < 0. The mutant phenotypes invade the resident system, but the residents cannot invade the mutants. Furthermore, all interior trajectories of (15) that start close to the resident equilibrium evolve to the equilibrium of the mutant system. That is, the mutant phenotypes have replaced the residents.
Historically independent replacement
As mentioned in Introduction (see also Sect. 5), if the successful invasions occur through a sequence of evolutionary substitutions that does not depend on whether a rare mutant first appears in species one or in species two, then evolutionary replacement ensues. This is shown for two-species competitive LV systems in Theorem 4.
For two-species competitive LV systems, the invasion conditions completely characterize evolutionary substitution by Sect. 3. Since we are not concerned about the order that mutants appear for historically independent replacement, we assume that the stable two-dimensional systems consisting of one phenotype from each species satisfy (i) ρ 1 ρ 2 can be invaded by both μ 1 and μ 2 (ii) μ 1 ρ 2 can be invaded by μ 2 but not by ρ 1 (iii) ρ 1 μ 2 can be invaded by μ 1 but not by ρ 2 (iv) μ 1 μ 2 cannot be invaded by ρ 1 or by ρ 2 .
By Theorem 2, each subsystem consisting of three phenotypes has a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium where exactly one of the resident phenotypes goes extinct. The sequence of evolutionary substitutions given by rare mutations can then serve as a model of punctuated equilibrium based on the fossil record in palaeontology, a concept suggested by Eldredge and Gould [13] . This theory claims that during a short geological time, new species arrive in rapid succession and contribute revolutionary morphological changes. Following these speciation events, an evolutionary stable ecosystem rapidly evolves, where lineages are in stasis. We have previously demonstrated that, in a two-species coevolutionary model, successful invasion is quickly followed by evolutionary changes in behaviour, leading to a sequence of punctuated equilibrium [8] . Historically independent replacement implies that the final outcome for the ecosystem can be predicted without knowing the sequence of mutations and their intermediate stasis events.
Theorem 4 Suppose a two-species competitive system exhibits historically independent replacement. In other words, the four two-dimensional faces ρ 1 ρ 2 , ρ 2 μ 1 , ρ 1 μ 2 and μ 1 μ 2 have globally asymptotically stable interior equilibria that satisfy (16) . Then, there is no interior equilibrium where mutants and residents coexist. Moreover, the equilibrium (0, 0, μ * 1 , μ * 2 ) with both mutants present is globally asymptotically stable for the resident-mutant system (12) with N = 2. That is, evolutionary replacement occurs.
Proof The general two-species competitive resident-mutant system has the forṁ
where r 1 > 0, r 2 > 0 and a i j > 0 for all i, j correspond to the entries of the interaction matrix −A. Consider the associated systeṁ
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This is also a competitive system where the interaction matrix − A is given by
System (18) has the same interior equilibria as well as the same equilibria on each boundary face as the original system (17) . In general, the stability of the same equilibrium for systems (17) and (18) can be different. However, for each equilibrium on a two-dimensional boundary face, their stability properties for both systems are the same. For example, (0, 0, μ * 1 , μ * 2 ) is an equilibrium in the interior of the mutant system (17) if and only if it is for system (18) . Also, (0, 0, μ * 1 , μ * 2 ) is locally asymptotically stable on its two-dimensional face for system (17) is positive if and only if (0, 0, μ * 1 , μ * 2 ) is locally asymptotically stable on its two-dimensional face for system (18) . Finally, (0, 0, μ * 1 , μ * 2 ) can be invaded by the resident phenotype of species 1 for system (17) if and only if r 1 − a 13 μ * 1 − a 14 μ * 2 > 0 if and only if 1 − a 13 r 1 μ * 1 − a 14 r 1 μ * 2 > 0 if and only if (0, 0, μ * 1 , μ * 2 ) can be invaded by the resident phenotype of species 1 for system (18) .
By Hofbauer and Sigmund ( [19] , Exercise 7.5.2), the dynamics of system (18) is the "same" as the replicator equation on the three-dimensional strategy simplex 4 
Moreover, this replicator equation is also given by a payoff matrix of the form B where
by subtracting the diagonal entry of − A from all entries in its column. We want to show the assumptions that the four two-dimensional faces ρ 1 ρ 2 , ρ 2 μ 1 , ρ 1 μ 2 and μ 1 μ 2 have globally asymptotically stable interior equilibria that satisfy (16) imply that this matrix game has no equilibrium in the interior of 4 . First, globally asymptotic stability of interior equilibria on the four two-dimensional faces implies that b 12 43 are all positive. The other entries in B, indicated by boldface in (19) , may be positive or negative. The invasion assumptions correspond to the following eight inequalities in (20) . For instance, the interior resident equilibrium for the replicator equation 21 . This is invadable by mutant strategy of species 1 if b 31 
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By Akin [1] , there is no equilibrium in the interior of 4 if and only if there is some dominance relation among the four strategies. In fact, we show in "Appendix A2" that a convex combination of the two mutant strategies dominates a convex combination of the two resident strategies. That is, for matrix B, we show dominance of the form y(row 1 
for some x, y ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the replicator equation has no interior equilibrium and so neither does (17) .
Given an interior trajectory of (17), the dominance in matrix B means that is strictly decreasing. Moreover, since the trajectory converges to the carrying simplex of the competitive system (and so is bounded as well as bounded away from the origin), the method of proof of Theorem 3 generalizes to show that lim t→∞ ρ 1 ρ 2 = 0. Thus, there can be no limit point in the interior of a three-dimensional face since this face must include the μ 1 μ 2 plane in which case the only limit point is (0, 0, μ * 1 , μ * 2 ). That is, if the trajectory does not converge to (0, 0, μ * 1 , μ * 2 ), then all its limit points must be in the four curves of the carrying simplex contained in the ρ 1 μ 1 , ρ 1 μ 2 , ρ 2 μ 1 , ρ 2 μ 2 planes. The trajectory cannot converge to an equilibrium point on any of these four curves since all such points have an unstable manifold of at least one dimension. That is, either the trajectory converges to (0, 0, μ * 1 , μ * 2 ) or else to a heteroclinic cycle around these four curves (in analogy to Example 3). This latter scenario is impossible due to the locally asymptotically stable equilibrium for the curve in the ρ 1 μ 2 plane (or the ρ 2 μ 1 plane). In summary, every interior trajectory converges to (0, 0, μ * 1 , μ * 2 ), which is then globally asymptotically stable.
Conclusion
Our motivation is rooted in evolutionary game theory. Specifically, the approach we adopt has parallels with invasion and stability concepts used in frequency-dependent selection theory modelled by evolutionary game theory. There, the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was introduced by Maynard Smith and Price [21] as a population state that cannot be invaded by any mutant strategy that is sufficiently rare. Later, Apaloo [3] defined a neighbourhood invader strategy (NIS) as a strategy that can successfully invade all nearby strategies. The combination of these two concepts for matrix games yields an ESNIS [4] that exhibits the frequency-dependent version of evolutionary substitution. On the other hand, evolution works on the ecological system too, where the interactions are also densitydependent. As we saw in Sect. 2, ecological stability together with the mutant phenotype being an ESNIS is equivalent to evolutionary substitution for single-species LV systems (that also includes population density effects). This answers one of the questions posed by Garay [15] (i.e. what kind of mutant is able to substitute for or replace the resident clone) who was also interested in circumstances when stable coexistence of resident and mutant phenotypes arises. In the present paper, we extend these concepts of substitution and replacement to Nspecies LV systems, relying as well on the notion of evolutionary stability introduced earlier for these systems [6, 16] . From this perspective, the paper can be viewed as extending the theory of ecological and evolutionary stability to N -species LV systems. Simultaneous invasion by two species occurs naturally as the following example shows. When an invasive species appears, it is usually introduced at a low density. An important question is whether the invasive species can or cannot substitute for the native species. For instance, grey squirrels (Sciurus carolinensis) originated in North America and are a vector for a smallpox virus that evolved there. Grey squirrels (and this virus) have been introduced in many places throughout the world (e.g. England and continental Europe) where they do not need large numbers to start a new population. In Great Britain, grey squirrels have been able to spread 17-25 times faster through competitive exclusion [5] of the red squirrel (Sciurus vulgaris) due to increased mortality of reds from the squirrelpox virus which was not resident in Europe [26, 30] . Grey squirrels do not die from this virus, but the virus can spread from them and infect red squirrels, causing death. Clearly, in this case, two species (i.e. grey squirrels and its virus) simultaneously invade into the European ecosystems, and the interactions in the whole ecosystem determine the success of grey squirrels.
In the evolutionary process, past historical events play a crucial role in explaining structural and functional features [18] in the ecosystem. For instance, nectarivory and pollination by birds is common in southern Australia, while in Europe social bees play these roles [14] . However, ecosystem convergence has been considered by ecologists as evidence not only in the present [24] but also between the Pleistocene period and the present [9, 10] . This means that under similar conditions (e.g. climate, soils), similar ecosystems evolve. Since mutation is a random process, the histories of evolution of these ecosystems are different, but the outcome is similar as would be expected if it is independent of the order mutations occur. For such biological systems, we feel that the concept of historically independent replacement introduced in Sect. 4.1 is important.
Appendix A1. Remark 1
Proof of formula (6) . A major consequence is that geometrically, our task is to find a point (x * , y * ) in the unit square [0, 1] 2 that is (strictly) above L 1 , below L 2 , to the left of L 3 , and to the right of L 4 .
Set y 0i = i (0) and y 1i = i (1), i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Let x 0i be the x-coordinate of L i at y = 0. Let x 1i be the x-coordinate of L i at y = 1. (If the slope of L i is zero-which may happen only for i = 1 and i = 2-then x 0i and x 1i are not defined. In what follows, we shall give a special attention to this degenerate possibility.) Using the new notation, our results so far can be rewritten as
Observe that L 2 and L 4 both have positive height at x = 1 (i.e. y 12 = b 32 b 12 > 0 and 24 > 0 by (20h0) and (20e0)) and that the heights of L 1 and L 3 are both less than 1 at x = 0 (i.e. y 01 = 1 − b 41 b 21 < 1 and y 03 = b 23 −b 43 b 23 −b 13 < 1 by (20c0) and (20g0)):
In view of inequalities (20c), (20e), (20h), (20 g), we obtain that
Combining the very first inequalities in (23) and in (25) , we conclude that
Note that y 14 > 0 is equivalent to x 04 < 1 and y 14 ≤ 1 is equivalent to x 14 ≥ 1. There are several equivalencies of the types above, e.g. the equivalence between x 13 > 0 and y 03 < 1 etc. From now on, we have to distinguish CASES 1,2,3,4 depending on the sign of the slopes of L 1 and L 2 . CASE 1. Assume that L 1 and L 2 have nonnegative slopes. CASE 2. Assume that L 1 has negative slope and L 2 has nonnegative slope. CASE 3. Assume that L 1 has nonnegative slope and L 2 has negative slope. CASE 4. Assume that L 1 and L 2 have negative slopes.
In view of (22), Slope(
Within each CASE, recalling y 12 > 0 and y 14 > 0 from (24), we have three subcases according to
In Cases 1(i), 2(i), 3(i), 4(i), 1(ii), 2(ii), 3(ii), and 4(ii), our choice for x = x * ∈ [0, 1] and y = y * ∈ [0, 1] will be (x * , y * ) = (1, min{y 12 , y 14 } − ε) where ε > 0 is sufficiently small.
In view of inequality (26) and assumption 0 < y 14 ≤ 1 (for (i)) or assumptions 0 < y 12 ≤ 1 and y 14 > 1 (for (ii)), (x * , y * ) is above L 1 , below L 2 , and to the right of L 4 . Thus, the mutant strategy of species 1 will dominate a convex combination of the two resident strategies if (x * , y * ) is to the left of L 3 . That is, it remains to check that y 14 > max{y 11 , y 13 }.
Case 1(i). Recall that y 14 ≤ 1 is equivalent to x 14 ≥ 1. With the help of a little plane geometry, y 14 > y 13 is implied 15 by x 04 < x 03 < 1 and 1 ≤ x 14 < x 13 . In order to prove inequality y 14 > y 11 , the cases Slope(L 1 ) > 0 and Slope(L 1 ) = 0 will be considered separately. Note that the lines L 2 , L 3 , and L 4 are already fixed. If Slope(L 1 ) > 0, then x 11 is defined and satisfies x 14 < x 11 . In fact, 11 follows directly from assumption b 41 > b 31 and (20f). Combining 1 ≤ x 14 < x 11 and y 01 < y 04 < 1 (the second chain of inequalities in (25) ), inequality y 14 > y 11 follows by an elementary geometric argument for two lines in the plane. The degenerate case Slope(L 1 ) = 0 is easier. Then, x 11 does not exist but y 11 = y 01 < y 04 < y 14 and we are done.
Case 1(ii). By using (26), both y 11 < 1 and y 13 < 1 follow from assumption 0 < y 12 ≤ 1. Since y 14 > 1, we conclude that inequality (27) holds true in the slightly stronger form y 14 > 1 > max{y 11 , y 13 }.
The proof of inequality y 14 > y 11 in Case 1(i) above works also in Case 3(i). For the remaining Cases 2(i) and 4(i), the slope of L 1 is negative (and the slope of L 4 is positive). Thus, y 14 > y 11 is a direct consequence of inequality y 01 < y 04 in (25) . Fortunately, the proofs of inequality y 14 > y 13 are the same in Cases 1(i), 2(i), 3(i), and 4(i). Moreover, the proof in Case 1(ii) can be repeated in Cases 2(ii), 3(ii), and 4(ii), too. Absolutely no modifications are needed.
Thus, only Cases 1(iii), 2(iii), 3(iii), and 4(iii) are left. We claim that an (x * , y * ) in the unit square of the form (x * , 1) will work in all these cases. Recall that, by assumption, y 12 > 1 and y 14 > 1. Similarly, y 13 > 0 by (25) . In what follows, inequalities from (23)-(25) will be recalled without any further notice.
Case 1(iii). If y 11 < 1 and y 13 < 1, then we can take (x * , y * ) = (1, 1) (i.e. the mutant phenotype of species 1 dominates its resident phenotype).
If y 11 ≥ 1, both the existence of x 11 and inequality 0 < x 11 ≤ 1 are implied by y 01 < 1 ≤ y 11 . As a by-product, we obtain that Slope(L 1 ) > 0. Recall that 0 < x 14 < x 13 . The argument we used in Case 1(i) leads to x 14 < x 11 again. In what follows, we distinguish two cases according as Slope(L 2 ) > 0 or Slope(L 2 ) = 0. Suppose that Slope(L 2 ) > 0. Then y 01 < y 02 < y 12 and y 11 < y 12 give rise both to the existence of x 12 and to inequality x 12 < x 11 . Since 0 < max{1, y 13 } < y 12 and x 02 < x 03 (i.e. −b 42 b 32 −b 42 < 1 − b 23 b 43 by (20d) when b 32 − b 42 > 0 which is equivalent to Slope(L 2 ) > 0) with x 03 < 1, also inequality x 12 < x 13 holds true. All in all, we arrived at the chain of inequalities 1 ≥ min{x 11 , x 13 } > max{0, x 12 , x 14 } and can take (x * , y * ) = (min{x 11 , x 13 } − ε, 1). In the degenerate case Slope(L 2 ) = 0, we have 0 < x 11 ≤ 1, x 14 < x 11 and 0 < x 14 < x 13 . In particular, 0 < x 14 < min{x 11 , x 13 } ≤ 1. Given x ∈ [0, x 11 ) arbitrarily, (x, 1) is (strictly) below L 2 and above L 1 . For x ∈ (x 14 , x 13 ), (x, 1) is to the left of L 3 and to the right of L 4 . Thus, the choice (x * , y * ) = (min{x 11 , x 13 } − ε, 1) is still possible.
If y 11 < 1 and y 13 ≥ 1, consider first the special case Slope(L 1 ) ≥ 0 and Slope(L 2 ) = 0. Since y 11 < 1 < y 12 , all points on the top edge of the unit square (i.e. for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and y = 1) are (strictly) below L 2 and above L 1 . Combining inequalities 0 < x 14 < x 13 and y 03 < 1 ≤ y 13 , we arrive at 0 < x 14 < x 13 ≤ 1. In particular, we can take (x * , y * ) = (x 13 − ε, 1). Now we turn our attention to the special case Slope(L 1 ) > 0 and Slope(L 2 ) > 0. Thus, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 are strictly increasing functions. This implies the existence of the intersection points x 11 , x 12 , x 13 , x 14 . Clearly, 0 < x 14 < x 13 ≤ 1. The derivation of inequalities x 14 < x 11 and x 12 < x 13 is exactly the same as in the case 15 Note that a purely algebraic proof of inequality y 14 
= y 13 is considerably harder. Elementary examples show that y 14 ≥ y 13 does not follow from x 04 < x 03 < 1 and 0 < x 14 < x 13 . Thus, the equivalence between y 14 ≤ 1 and x 14 ≥ 1 (due to the fact that the slope of L 4 is positive) leads to a crucial improvement of (25). y 11 ≥ 1 above. The remaining inequality x 12 < x 11 follows from the chains of inequalities y 01 < y 02 < y 12 , y 01 < y 11 < 1 < y 12 via an easy geometric argument. Depending on the relative position of y 02 , y 11 and 1 in the open interval (y 01 , y 12 ), we have to consider three separate subcases, namely y 11 < 1 ≤ y 02 , y 02 ≤ y 11 < 1 or y 11 ≤ y 02 ≤ 1. (If y 11 ≤ y 02 ≤ 1, then one of the inequalities should be strict.) In each of the three subcases, we arrive at inequality x 12 < 1 < x 11 . Again, an appropriate choice in the unit square is (x * , y * ) = (min{x 11 , x 13 } − ε, 1). Finally, consider now the remaining special case Slope(L 1 ) = 0 and Slope(L 2 ) > 0. As before, 0 < x 14 < x 13 ≤ 1 and x 12 < x 13 (and y 11 < 1, y 12 > 1). For x ∈ (x 14 , x 13 ), (x, 1) is to the left of L 3 and to the right of L 4 . Given x ∈ (x 12 , 1] arbitrarily, (x, 1) is (strictly) below L 2 and above L 1 . Thus, the choice (x * , y * ) = (x 13 − ε, 1) is appropriate.
Case 2(iii). If Slope(L 1 ) < 0 and Slope(L 2 ) = 0 , then 1 > y 01 > y 11 and y 02 > y 12 > 1. Thus, all points on the top edge of the unit square are (strictly) above L 1 and below L 2 . Since 0 < x 14 < x 13 and x 14 < 1 (by using y 14 > 1 and Slope(L 4 ) > 0), we can take (x * , y * ) = (x 14 + ε, 1). If Slope(L 1 ) < 0 and Slope(L 2 ) > 0, then x 12 exists and (by using y 12 > 1) satisfies x 12 < 1. Similarly, x 14 < 1 and x 11 < 0. As in the proof of Case 1(iii), inequalities x 02 < x 03 < 1 and max{1, y 13 } < y 12 imply via some geometry that x 12 < x 13 . In view of 0 < x 14 < x 13 , we can take (x * , y * ) = (max{x 12 , x 14 } + ε, 1). Note that the choice (x * , y * ) = (min{1, x 13 } − ε, 1) is also possible.
Case 3(iii). Since Slope(L 2 ) < 0, we have y 02 > y 12 . As a trivial consequence of assumption y 12 > 1, all points on the top edge of the unit square are (strictly) below L 2 . In addition, x 12 > 1 . Similarly, assumption y 14 > 1 implies that x 14 < 1. Recall that, from (25) , 0 < x 14 < x 13 . Last but not least, the proof of inequality x 14 < x 11 in Case 1(i) with Slope(L 1 ) > 0 can be repeated and leads to (x * , y * ) = (x 14 + ε, 1) . If Slope(L 1 ) = 0, then y 01 < 1 implies that the choice (x * , y * ) = (x 14 + ε, 1) is still possible.
Case 4(iii). Every point on the top edge of the unit square is (strictly) above L 1 and below L 2 . Recall that 0 < x 14 < x 13 and note that x 14 < 1 by assumption y 14 > 1. As above, we can take (x * , y * ) = (x 14 + ε, 1).
